Artificial intelligence as a potential subject of property and intellectual property relations
Abstract
The article analyzes the possibility to provide legal capacity to artificial intelligence, which would lead to the emergence of a new subject in legal relations. The aim of the article is to reveal whether it is possible to recognize, that artificial intelligence is able to have property and intellectual property rights. To achieve this aim, dialectical, comparative, dogmatic and legal methods are used. It is noted that according to recent studies, there are more and more grounds for recognizing artificial intelligence as subjects of legal relations. Particular attention in the article is paid to the specifics of the status of artificial intelligence in property relations. The consequences of empowering artificial intelligence with the right to property are analyzed. The conclusion is drawn on the appropriateness of such an approach, since this will solve the problem of liability for damage caused by artificial intelligence. The possibility of endowing artificial intelligence with property on the basis of trust before resolving the issue of its legal personality is proposed. Modern approaches to the problem of rights to objects of creativity created by artificial intelligence are considered in the article. The options for the distribution of rights to such objects are analyzed depending on the degree of human participation in their creation and on the level of complexity of the artificial intelligence that creates these objects. The general conclusion is made about the possibility to qualify artificial intelligence as a subject of legal relations, in particular, of property and intellectual property relations.
Downloads
References
Baranov, O. (2017). The Internet of Things and Artificial Intelligence: Origins of the Problem of Legal Regulation. In IT Law: Problems and Prospects for Development in Ukraine. Lviv: National University of Lviv Polytechnic.
Borysova, V., Spasybo-Fateyeva, I., & Yarotsky V. (2007). Civil law of Ukraine. Kyiv: Yurinkom Inter.
Bridy, A. (2016). The Evolution of authorship: work made by code. Columbia Journal of Law & Arts, 39, 395-401.
Čerka, P., Grigienė, J. & Sirbikytėb G. (2017). Is it possible to grant legal personality to artificial intelligence software systems? Computer Law & Security Review, 33 (5), 685-699.
Duarenus, F. (1554). “Epistola ad Andream Guillartum de ratione docendi, discendique iuris conscripta”. In Opera Omnia. Lugduni.
Enrich, E. (2015). Continental European (droit d’auteur) and anglo-saxon (copyright) systems of copyright and performing rights organizations in Europe and the USA. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/10300580/CONTINENTAL_EUROPEAN_droit_dauteur_AND_ANGLO-SAXON_copyright_SYSTEMS_OF_COPYRIGHT_AND_PERFORMING_RIGHTS_ORGANISATIONS_IN_EUROPE_AND_THE_USA.
European Commission (2020). On Artificial Intelligence – A European approach to excellence and trust. White Paper. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-white-paper-artificial-intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf
European Parliament (2017). Resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)). Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0051+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
Gadzhiev, G. & Voinikanis, E. (2018). Could Robot be a Legal Subject? (In Search of Legal Forms for Digital Economy Regulation). Pravo – Zhurnal Vysshei Shkoly Ekonomiki, 4, 24-48.
Gamauf, R. (2009). Slaves doing business: the role of Roman law in the economy of a Roman household. European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire, 16(3), 331-346.
Guadamuz, A. (2017). Artificial intelligence and copyright. WIPO Magazine, 5. Retrieved from https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/05/article_0003.html
Halphina, R. (1974). General doctrine of legal relationship. Moscow: Legal literature.
Heise, A. & Cropp, F. (1827). Juristische Abhandlungen mit Entscheidungen des Oberappellationsgerichts der vier freien Städte Deutschlands. Hamburg: Perthes.
Ivanov, A. (2017). Do androids dream about electric sheep? Retrieved from https://zakon.ru/blog/2017/2/15/mechtayut_li_androidy_ob_elektroovcah
Ivanov, S. (2018). Facebook introduced artificial intelligence that can turn any track into a symphony. Retrieved from https://hightech.fm/2018/05/24/facebook
Kamyshansky, V., Rudenko, E., Kolominetz, E. & Osadchenko, E. (2019). Regarding the issue of the essence of legal treatment and the possibility of granting legal status to a robot in Civil Law. In E. Popkova (eds.), Ubiquitous Computing and the Internet of Things. Studies in Computational Intelligence, 826, 299-306.
Karchevsky, M. (2017). Basic Problems of Legal Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Socialization. In: IT Law: Problems and Prospects for Development in Ukraine. Lviv: National University of Lviv Polytechnic.
Katasonov, V. (2014). Transhumanism: a new civilization threat to humanity. Retrieved from https://riss.ru/analitycs/6613
Kharytonov, E. & Kharytonova O. (2017). IT law: theory and practice. Odesa: Fenix.
Kharytonov, E., & Kharytonova, O. (2008). Civil legal relationships. Kyiv: Istyna.
Kleinberg, J., Ludwig, J., Mullainathant, S. & Sunstein, C. R. (2019). Discrimination in the age of algorithms. Journal of Legal Analysis, 10, 1-62.
Kokhanovska, O. (2006). Theoretical issues of informational relationships in civil law. Kyiv: Kyiv University.
Koval, M. (2017). Electronic personality: why the EU discusses the rights of robots. Retrieved from https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/experts/2017/01/24/7060539/.
Kutateladze, O. & Zubar, V. (2011). Savigny F.K. System of modern Roman law. Moscow: Statut.
Liptsik, D. (2002). Copyright and Related Rights. Moscow: Ladomir Unesco Publishing House.
Marushak, A. (2011). Definition of the concept “informational human rights”. Information and Law, 2, 21-26.
Matuzov, N. & Malko, A. (2004). Theory of State and Law. Moscow: Publishing house “Lawyer”.
Morkhat, P. (2018). Intelligent robot as the author of a work or invention. Legislation and law, 8, 172-177.
Nekit, K., Kolodin, D. & Fedorov, V. (2020). Personal data protection and liability for damage in the field of the Internet of things. Juridical Tribune, 10(1), 80-93.
Nikitina, M. (1972). Copyright on works of science, literature and art. Kazan: Kazan Publishing House.
Pavlovskaya, Y. (2018). “A robot cannot have self-awareness”: interview with the creator of an android who works at an insurance company. Retrieved from https://vc.ru/future/48827-u-robota-ne-mozhet-byt-samosoznaniya-intervyu-s-sozdatelnicey-androida-kotoryy-rabotaet-v-strahovoy-kompanii
Pearlman, R. (2018). Recognizing artificial intelligence (AI) as authors and inventors under U.S. Intellectual Property Law. Richmond Journal of Law & Technology, 24(2), i-38.
Pushkarev, A. (2014). Creativity and Artificial Intelligence: A Problem Statement. Humanities, socio-economic and social sciences, 12-1, 93-96.
Razuvayev, I. (2007). Theoretical issues of general doctrine of the subjects of law. Legal Thought, 3, 58-59.
Saveliev, V. & Kofanova, l. (1997). Guy. Institutions. Moscow: Lawyer, 1997.
Shpenov, D. (2011). Subjects of legal relationships in the information sphere. Visnyk of the Kyiv University of Taras Shevchenko: Legal Sciences, 89, 92-95.
Sunstein, C. R. (2001). Of artificial intelligence adn legal reasoning. University of Chicago Law School Roundtable, 8(1), 29-36.
Zaripov, R. (1971). Cybernetics and music. Moscow: Publishing house “Knowledge”.
Zhilnikova, E. (2011). Problems of differentiation of concepts “subject of law” and “subject of legal relations”. Historical, philosophical, political and legal sciences, cultural studies and art criticism. Questions of theory and practice, 7 (13), 74-77.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Authors publishing in our Journal comply to the following terms:
1. Authors keep their work’s copyrights, but they guarantee Ius Humani Law Journal to be the first publisher of their papers. They grant the Journal will a Creative Commons Attribution License, under which their work can be shared with the condition that it is appropriately cited.
2. Authors are aware and accept that the Ius Humani Team will try to give the greatest diffusion to the Journal, which means, among other things, that its printed and electronic editions will be distributed among different databases and scientific indexes.
3. Authors can establish further clauses for non exclusive distribution, such as publication on a separate book or placing in an institutional data-base. Nevertheless, a note should be always added to explain that the paper was originally published in Ius Humani Law Journal.
4. We permit and encourage authors to share their work through Internet before and during the editorial process to receive further recommendations and wider references (we recommend you read the article The Effect of Open Access).
