The Impact of the Republican Notion of Freedom on The Lawyer's Role
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to analyze the characteristics the lawyer’s role acquires once the republican conception of freedom as non-domination is adopted. Two methods are used, conceptual analysis and reflective equilibrium. Section II shows how the dominant conception of lawyer’s role is based on an alternative idea of freedom as non-interference. In section III, the criticisms that Republicans have directed to this conception of freedom are presented. Finally, the new features the lawyer’s role adopts once this defective conception of freedom is replaced are listed and explained. First, the tension between the character of the lawyer as an auxiliary to justice and as a defender of the client's freedom disappears. Second, the lawyer ceases to be a mere technical assistant and becomes the first barrier that prevents the client from becoming a dominating agent. Third, the adversarial system becomes an instrument to disperse control between the parties, preventing one from dominating the other. Fourth, the self-regulation of the profession becomes a mechanism to avoid horizontal and vertical domination.
Downloads
References
Berlin, I. (1969). Two Concepts of Liberty. In Four Essays on Liberty (pp. 118-172). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berlin, I. (2002). Two Concepts of Liberty. In Liberty (pp. 166-217). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Böhmer, M. (2008). Igualadores y Traductores. La Ética del Abogado en una Democracia Constitucional. In M. Alegre, R. Gargarella, & C. Rosenkrantz (eds.), Homenaje a Carlos Nino. Buenos Aires: La Ley.
Chambliss, E., & Wilkinks, D. (2002). Promoting Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting. Hofstra Law Review, 30(3), pp. 691-716.
Chappell, T. (2014). Knowing What to Do. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Finnis, J. (1996). The Truth in Legal Positivism. En R. P. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (pp. 195-214). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gordon, R. W. (1988). The Independence of Lawyers. Boston University Law Review, 68(1), pp. 1-83.
Hayek, F. (1960). The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge & Keegan Paul.
Hayek, F. (1973). Law, Liberty and Legislation, vol. I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hobbes, T. (1997). Leviathan. New York: Touchstone.
Koniak, S. P., & Cohen, G. M. (2000). In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law. In D. L. Rhode (ed.), Ethics in Practice: Lawyer’s Role, Responsibility and Regulation (pp. 177-204). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kronman, A. (1995). The Last Lawyer: Failing ideals of the Legal Profession. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Laborde, C. (2008). Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lovett, F. (2001). Domination: A preliminary analysis. The Monist, 84, pp. 98-112.
Lovett, F. (2010). A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lovett, F. (2012). What Count as Arbitrary Power? Journal of Political Power, 5(1), pp. 137-152.
Martí, J. luis. (2006). La República Deliberativa. Madrid-Barcelona: Marcial Pons.
Maynor, J. (2003). Republicanism in the Modern World. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Najemy, J. M. (1979). Guild Republicanism in Trecento Florence: The Successes and Ultimate Failure of CorporatePolitics. The American Historical Review, 84(1), pp. 53-71.
Peñas Defago, M. A., & Morán Faúndes, J. M. (2014). Conservative litigation against sexual and reproductive health policies in Argentina. Reproductive Health Matters, 22(44), pp. 82-90.
Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pettit, P. (2011). The Instability of Freedom as Noninterference: The Case of Isaiah Berlin. Ethics, 121, pp. 693-716.
Pettit, P. (2012). On The People’s Terms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Seleme, H. O. (2015). Un Nuevo Adversario de la Libertad como No-Dominación. Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía Política y Humanidades, 33, pp. 59-82.
Skinner, Q. (1995). The Paradoxes of Liberty. In S. Darwall (Ed.), Equal Freedom (pp. 15-38). Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.
Slote, M. (2001). Morals from Motives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Swanton, C. (2003). Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Talbot, S. (2013). Advancing human rights in patient care through strategic litigation: Challenging medical confidentiality issues in countries in transition. Health and Human Rights, 15(2), pp. 69-79.
Viroli, M. (2002). Republicanism. New York: Hill and Wang.
Zagzebski, L. (2010). Exemplarist Virtue Theory. Metaphilosophy, 41(1), pp. 41-57.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Authors publishing in our Journal comply to the following terms:
1. Authors keep their work’s copyrights, but they guarantee Ius Humani Law Journal to be the first publisher of their papers. They grant the Journal will a Creative Commons Attribution License, under which their work can be shared with the condition that it is appropriately cited.
2. Authors are aware and accept that the Ius Humani Team will try to give the greatest diffusion to the Journal, which means, among other things, that its printed and electronic editions will be distributed among different databases and scientific indexes.
3. Authors can establish further clauses for non exclusive distribution, such as publication on a separate book or placing in an institutional data-base. Nevertheless, a note should be always added to explain that the paper was originally published in Ius Humani Law Journal.
4. We permit and encourage authors to share their work through Internet before and during the editorial process to receive further recommendations and wider references (we recommend you read the article The Effect of Open Access).
