Garantizar la discreción del banco central en la emisión de préstamos de estabilización en tiempos de la pandemia del Covid-19

Palabras clave: Poderes discrecionales, Banco Central, Préstamos de estabilización, Superación de consecuencias económicas, Pandemia Covid-19

Resumen

Las medidas restrictivas impuestas por los gobiernos de todo el mundo para contrarrestar la pandemia de Covid-19 indudablemente tienen un impacto negativo en la economía. Uno de los instrumentos del estado, que permite salvar a sectores enteros de la economía, incluido el sector bancario, de la quiebra, son los préstamos de estabilización del banco central. Por tanto, resulta relevante y oportuno analizar el uso de los poderes discrecionales de los bancos centrales y de sus órganos rectores en la emisión de préstamos de estabilización para superar las consecuencias económicas de la pandemia de Covid-19. Los autores utilizaron diferentes métodos científicos, como el método dialéctico, el método de comparación, el método de análisis y síntesis elemental-teórico, el análisis hermenéutico y el uso de pronósticos. Como resultado del estudio, los autores corroboraron una definición de los poderes del órgano rector del banco central para tomar decisiones sobre la provisión de préstamos de estabilización a los bancos, como parte de la función del banco central para mantener la estabilidad de la moneda nacional y la regulación indicativa de los bancos. Los autores concluyeron que es necesario un enfoque ampliado de los límites de la discreción del banco central, sobre la base de la armonización del propósito económico de las decisiones sobre la emisión de préstamos de estabilización a los bancos, de acuerdo con la constitución y las leyes del país.

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Biografía del autor/a

Oleg Podtserkovnyi, National University "Odesa Law Academy"

Doctor of Legal Science, Professor, Head of the Department of the Economic Law and Procedure of the National University «Odessa Law Academy», Corresponding Member of the Ukrainian National Academy of Law Sciences (Odesa, Ukraine)

Kristina Vozniakovska, National University “Odessa Law Academy” (Chernivtsi, Ukraine)

Doctor of Legal Science, Associate Professor, Department of Civil Law, Chernivtsi Law Institute National University “Odessa Law Academy” (Chernivtsi, Ukraine)

Citas

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Publicado
2020-08-24
Cómo citar
Podtserkovnyi, O., & Vozniakovska, K. (2020). Garantizar la discreción del banco central en la emisión de préstamos de estabilización en tiempos de la pandemia del Covid-19. Ius Humani. Revista De Derecho, 9(2), 65-86. https://doi.org/10.31207/ih.v9i2.244