Same Sex Marriage: The Inappropriate Way in the Search for Equal Equality
Abstract
In 2019, the Constitutional Court issued two sentences that, in a nutshell, legally make equal marriage in Ecuador or of same-sex persons legally viable. These sentences were sent to the Court through the procedure of consultation of norm, in accordance with article 428 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador in order that the maximum constitutional justice court of the country exercise the concrete control of constitutionality, with regarding legal provisions that concern civil marriage and Advisory Opinion 24 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 24, 2017, requested by the Republic of Costa Rica regarding gender identity, and equality and non-discrimination Same-sex couples. The objective of this paper is to criticize the argumentative construction of the Court in these opinions, by demonstrating that said body arrived at inconsistent conclusions based on incorrect premises. For this purpose, the methodology used is hypothetical-deductive, in the light of the argumentative criticism that has been mentioned. The work is composed of the following lines of analysis: First, the denaturation of the concrete control of constitutionality. Second, the interpretation made to the applicable normative statements. Third, about the legal value of the advisory opinions of the Inter-American Court. Finally, some conclusions that will pay for the academic debate.
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References
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