Planned Differences: Argentina’s Universal Child Allowance from a human rights perspective
Keywords:
Social Rights, Universal Child Allowance, Equality, Children’s Rights, Social Policy
Abstract
This article intends to analyze Universal Child Allowance (UCA)—a large-scale conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in Argentina—from a human rights and constitutional perspective. Conditions required in the UCA system—which covers informal and unemployed workers—are compared to those established in family allowances, the contributory program created for registered workers. These differences in treatment are analyzed in connection with the right to equal treatment, taking into account applicable legal materials, including caselaw and theoretical contributions. After describing CCT programs in general and the specific features of UCA, and outlining Argentina’s constitutional and human rights framework, the article describes the specific conditions—maximum income, nationality, maximum number of covered children—applied only to informal and unregistered workers included in the UCA program. Compared to family allowances beneficiaries, workers under UCA have a much lower maximum wage limit to be eligible, and their children must fulfill nationality or legal residence requirements not applicable under the family allowances system. UCA covers only up to five children per family, while family allowances are paid to every child in formal workers’ families, with no restrictions. The article concludes that these planned differences in treatment are not admissible under Argentina’s human rights obligations and constitutional setting. The article also advocates a human rights-based design for social policies, in order to ensure consistency with Argentina’s Constitution and international obligations.
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References
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Ambort, M. & Straschnoy, M. (2018). Burocracias escolar y sanitaria, ¿facilitadores u obstaculizadores del acceso a la Asignación Universal por Hijo y la Asignación por Embarazo para la Protección Social? Horizontes Sociológicos, 5, 139-161.
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Argentinian Supreme Court. Calvo y Pesini, Rocío vs. Córdoba, Provincia de s/ amparo. 24-II-1998. Fallos, 321:194.
Argentinian Supreme Court. Inchauspe Hnos vs. Junta Nacional de Carnes. 1-IX-1944. Fallos, 199:483.
Argentinian Supreme Court. Irízar, José M. vs. Provincia de Misiones. 12-IX-1996. Fallos, 319:1934.
Argentinian Supreme Court. Q. C., S. Y. vs. Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires s/ amparo. 24-IV-2012. Fallos, 335:452.
Argentinian Supreme Court. Repetto, María Inés vs. Buenos Aires, Provincia de s/ inconstitucionalidad de normas legales. 8-XI-1988. Fallos, 311:2272.
Arza, C. (2018). Cash transfers for families and children in Argentina, Brazil and Chile: segmented expansion or universal benefits? Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy, 34(1), 58-75. doi:10.1080/21699763.2017.1415218
Barbosa Pinto, M. (2003). Interpretation and conversation. Legal Theory, 9(2), 157-179.
Bertranou, F. & Maurizio, R. (2012). Semi-conditional cash transfers in the form of familly allowances for children and adolescents in the informal economy in Argentina. International Social Security Review, 65(1), 53-72. doi:10.1111/j.1468-246X.2011.01419.x
Bidart Campos, G. J. (1991). Teoría general de los derechos humanos. Buenos Aires: Astrea.
Bidart Campos, G. J. (2000). Tratado elemental del derecho constitucional argentino (vol. I-A). Buenos Aires: Ediar.
Brewer-Carías, A. (2007). Some aspects of the “amparo” proceeding in Latin America as a constitutional judicial mean specifically established for the protection of human rights. International & Comparative Law Colloquium Papers, University of Maryland. At http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/iclc_papers/2/ (accessed 21-XI-2018).
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Ghazi, B. (2005). The IMF, the World Bank Group and the question of human rights. London: Transnational Publishers.
Ham, A. (2014). The impact of conditional cash transfers on educational inequality of opportunity. Latin American Research Review, 49(3), 153-175. doi:10.1353/lar.2014.0049
Hernández, A. M. (2010). Judicial Federalism and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Argentina. Rutgers Law Journal, 41, 907-930.
Hines, B. (2010). The right to migrate as a human right: the current Argentine immigration law. Cornell International Law Journal, 43, 471-511.
Jiménez, E. (2015). El derecho de toda persona a interponer acción expedita y rápida en defensa de sus derechos constitucionales. Análisis del artículo 43 de la Constitución Nacional. In M. Bernal, C. Pizzolo & A. Rossetti (eds.). ¡Que veinte años no es nada! Un análisis crítico a veinte años de la reforma constitucional de 1994 en Argentina (327-353). Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
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Koven Levit, J. (1999). The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise? Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 37, 281-351.
Lansberg Rodríguez, D. (2016). Life after Populism: Reforms in the Wake of the Receding Pink Tide. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 17(2), 56-65.
Lavinas, L. (2015). Latin America: Anti-poverty schemes instead of social protection. Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice, 7(1), 112-171.
Lo Prete, O. (2009). The protection of Religious Freedom by the National Constitution and by Human Rights Treaties in the Republic of Argentina. Brigham Young University Law Review, 2009, 673-695.
Lo Vuolo, R. (2012). The “Allowance per Child” program of Argentina and income cash transfer programs. The Perspective of the World Review, 4(2), 153-171.
Losada Revol, I. (2017). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs case: A ruling with unforeseen consequences in the enforcement of human rights in Argentina. Georgetown Journal of International Law, 49, 461-500.
Miller, J. M. (1997). The authority of a foreign talisman: A study of US constitutional practice as authority in nineteenth century Argentina and the Argentine elite’s leap of faith. American University Law Review, 46, 1483-1572.
Miller, J. M. (1997a). Judicial review and constitutional stability: a sociology of the US model and its collapse in Argentina. Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 21, 77-176.
Ministerio de Educación (2011). Análisis y evaluación de los aspectos educativos de la Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH). Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Educación de la Nación. Available at https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/ analisis_y_evaluacion_de_los_aspectos_educativos_de_la_auh.pdf (accesed 22-XI-2018)
Morais de Sá e Silva. M. (2017). Poverty reduction, education, and the global diffusion of conditional cash transfers. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-53094-9.
Morgan-Foster, Jason (2003). The relationship of IMF structural adjustment programs to economic, social, and cultural rights: the Argentine case revisited. Michigan Journal of International Law, 24, 577-646.
Morissens, A. (2018). The role of universal and targeted family benefits in reducing poverty in single-parent families in different employment situations. In R. Nieuwenhuis & L. C. Maldonado (eds.). The triple bind of single-parent families. Resources, employment and policies to improve well-being (359-381). Bristol: Policy Press at University of Bristol. doi:10.2307/j.ctt2204rvq.7
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Pautassi, L. (2017). Políticas sociales para la infancia en América Latina. Un balance urgente. Igualdad, autonomía y derechos sociales, 6, 45-91.
Pierri, G. & Assaad, R. (2014). The impact of Argentina’s Universal Child Allowance cash transfer program on children’s education outcomes. At http://paa2015.princeton.edu/papers/150844 (accesed 22-XI-2018).
Pribble, J. (2013). Welfare and party politics in Latin America. Cambridge University Press: New York. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139343299
Quiroga Lavié, H. (2000). Constitución de la Nación Argentina. Comentada (3rd ed.). Buenos Aires: Zavalía.
Rabinovich, L. & Diepeveen, S. (2015). The design of conditional cash transfers: Experiences from Argentina’s Universal Child Allowance. Development Policy Review, 33(5), 637-652. doi:10.1111/dpr.12127
Ravallion, M. (2016). The World Bank: why it is still needed and why it still disappoints. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(1), 77-94.
Ribe, H., Carvalho, S., Liebenthal, R., Nicholas, P. & Zucherman, E. (1990). How adjustment programs can help the poor. The World Bank’s experience. World Bank Discussion Papers, 71. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Rivera-Pérez, W. (2012). What the Constitution got to do with it: expanding the scope of constitutional rights into the private sphere. Creighton International and Comparative Law Journal, 3(1), 189-214.
Sagüés, N. P. (1999). Elementos de Derecho Constitucional (vols. 1 and 2). Buenos Aires: Astrea.
Skocpol, T. (1991). “Universal appeal: politically viable policies to combat poverty”. The Brookings Review, 9, 29-33.
Stampini, M. & Tornarolli, L. (2012). The growth of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean: did they go too far?, Policy Brief No. IDB-PB-185. Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank. Available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37306295 (accessed 22-XI-2018).
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UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (2012). Final draft of the guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights, submitted by the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona. A/HRC/21/39. Available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRB odies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-39_en.pdf (accesed 22-XI-2018).
Valencia Lomelí, E. (2008). Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America: an assessment of their contributions and limitations. Annual Review of Sociology, 34, 475-499.
Vommaro, G. (2017). La larga marcha de Cambiemos. La construcción silenciosa de un proyecto de poder. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
World Bank (2009). Report Nº 47874-AR (Project appraisal document on a proposed loan in the amount of US$450 million to the Argentine Republic for a basic protection project), Washington D.C.: World Bank.
World Bank (2011). Report Nº 59201-AR (Argentina - Basic Protection Project - additional financing). Washington D.C.: World Bank.
World Bank (2011b): “Argentina/World Bank: Social Protection Programs Expand to Benefit Children”, press release No:2011/362/LAC. 10-III-2011. Available at: http://go.worldbank.org/EHZC3EK3Z0 (accessed 22-XI-2018).
World Bank (2016). Report N° PAD1853 (Project appraisal document on a proposed loan in the amount of US$600 million to the Argentine Republic for a children and youth protection project). Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Ambort, M. & Straschnoy, M. (2018). Burocracias escolar y sanitaria, ¿facilitadores u obstaculizadores del acceso a la Asignación Universal por Hijo y la Asignación por Embarazo para la Protección Social? Horizontes Sociológicos, 5, 139-161.
Arcidiácono, P. (2016). Expansion and exclusion in the Universal Child Allowance programme in Argentina. Sur, 13(24), 27-34.
Arcidiácono, P. (2017). Asignación Universal por Hijo. Rupturas y continuidades en el campo de las transferencias de ingresos en la Argentina. Igualdad, autonomía y derechos sociales, 6, 11-42.
Argentinian Supreme Court. Calvo y Pesini, Rocío vs. Córdoba, Provincia de s/ amparo. 24-II-1998. Fallos, 321:194.
Argentinian Supreme Court. Inchauspe Hnos vs. Junta Nacional de Carnes. 1-IX-1944. Fallos, 199:483.
Argentinian Supreme Court. Irízar, José M. vs. Provincia de Misiones. 12-IX-1996. Fallos, 319:1934.
Argentinian Supreme Court. Q. C., S. Y. vs. Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires s/ amparo. 24-IV-2012. Fallos, 335:452.
Argentinian Supreme Court. Repetto, María Inés vs. Buenos Aires, Provincia de s/ inconstitucionalidad de normas legales. 8-XI-1988. Fallos, 311:2272.
Arza, C. (2018). Cash transfers for families and children in Argentina, Brazil and Chile: segmented expansion or universal benefits? Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy, 34(1), 58-75. doi:10.1080/21699763.2017.1415218
Barbosa Pinto, M. (2003). Interpretation and conversation. Legal Theory, 9(2), 157-179.
Bertranou, F. & Maurizio, R. (2012). Semi-conditional cash transfers in the form of familly allowances for children and adolescents in the informal economy in Argentina. International Social Security Review, 65(1), 53-72. doi:10.1111/j.1468-246X.2011.01419.x
Bidart Campos, G. J. (1991). Teoría general de los derechos humanos. Buenos Aires: Astrea.
Bidart Campos, G. J. (2000). Tratado elemental del derecho constitucional argentino (vol. I-A). Buenos Aires: Ediar.
Brewer-Carías, A. (2007). Some aspects of the “amparo” proceeding in Latin America as a constitutional judicial mean specifically established for the protection of human rights. International & Comparative Law Colloquium Papers, University of Maryland. At http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/iclc_papers/2/ (accessed 21-XI-2018).
Casullo, M. E. (2016). Argentina turns right, again. NACLA Report on the Americas, 48(4), 361-366. doi:10.1080/10714839.2016.1258279
Ceballos, M. & Lautier, B. (2013). Les CCTP en Amérique Latine: Entre modélisation internationale et conjonctures politiques nationales. Revue Tiers Monde, 214, 219-245. doi:10.3917/rtm.214.0219
CESCR (1990). General Comment No. 3. The nature of State parties obligations. Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CESCR/Shared%20Documents/1_Glob al/INT_CESCR_GEC_4758_E.doc (accesed 22-XI-2018),
CESCR (2001). Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. E/C.12/2001/10.
CESCR (2011): “Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – Argentina”, E/C.12/ARG/CO/3.
Conklin, M. & Davidson, D. (1986). The I.M.F. and economic and social human rights: a case study of Argentina, 1958-1985. Human Rights Quarterly, 8(2), 227-269.
Constitution [Constitución de la Nación Argentina]. Argentina’s Ministry of Justice official English translation, available at: http://www.biblioteca.jus.gov.ar/argentina-constitution.pdf (accessed 8-VIII-2018).
Craven, M. C. R. (1995). The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. A perspective on its development. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
D’Elía, V. V. & Navarro, A. (2013). Universal Child Allowance and school delay in Argentina. Revista de Análisis Económico, 28(2), 63-90. doi:10.4067/S0718-88702013000200003
Darrow, M. (2003). Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law. Portland: Hart Publishing.
Fiszbein, A., Schady, N., Ferreira, F., Grosh, M., Kelleher, N., Olinto, P. & Skoufias, E. (2009). Conditional cash transfers: reducing present and future poverty. Washington D.C.: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-7352-1
Garganta, S., Gasparini, L., Marchionni, M. & Tappata, M. (2016). The effect of cash transfers on fertility: evidence for Argentina. Population Research and Policy Review, 36(1), 1-24. doi:10.1007/s11113-016-9417-x
Gelli, M. A. (2005). Constitución de la Nación Argentina. Comentada y concordada (3rd edition). Buenos Aires: La Ley.
Ghazi, B. (2005). The IMF, the World Bank Group and the question of human rights. London: Transnational Publishers.
Ham, A. (2014). The impact of conditional cash transfers on educational inequality of opportunity. Latin American Research Review, 49(3), 153-175. doi:10.1353/lar.2014.0049
Hernández, A. M. (2010). Judicial Federalism and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Argentina. Rutgers Law Journal, 41, 907-930.
Hines, B. (2010). The right to migrate as a human right: the current Argentine immigration law. Cornell International Law Journal, 43, 471-511.
Jiménez, E. (2015). El derecho de toda persona a interponer acción expedita y rápida en defensa de sus derechos constitucionales. Análisis del artículo 43 de la Constitución Nacional. In M. Bernal, C. Pizzolo & A. Rossetti (eds.). ¡Que veinte años no es nada! Un análisis crítico a veinte años de la reforma constitucional de 1994 en Argentina (327-353). Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
Kanbur, R. & Vines, D. (2000). The World Bank and poverty reduction: past, present and future. In C. Gilbert & D. Vines (eds.). The World Bank. Structure and policies (87-107). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Koven Levit, J. (1999). The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise? Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 37, 281-351.
Lansberg Rodríguez, D. (2016). Life after Populism: Reforms in the Wake of the Receding Pink Tide. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 17(2), 56-65.
Lavinas, L. (2015). Latin America: Anti-poverty schemes instead of social protection. Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice, 7(1), 112-171.
Lo Prete, O. (2009). The protection of Religious Freedom by the National Constitution and by Human Rights Treaties in the Republic of Argentina. Brigham Young University Law Review, 2009, 673-695.
Lo Vuolo, R. (2012). The “Allowance per Child” program of Argentina and income cash transfer programs. The Perspective of the World Review, 4(2), 153-171.
Losada Revol, I. (2017). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs case: A ruling with unforeseen consequences in the enforcement of human rights in Argentina. Georgetown Journal of International Law, 49, 461-500.
Miller, J. M. (1997). The authority of a foreign talisman: A study of US constitutional practice as authority in nineteenth century Argentina and the Argentine elite’s leap of faith. American University Law Review, 46, 1483-1572.
Miller, J. M. (1997a). Judicial review and constitutional stability: a sociology of the US model and its collapse in Argentina. Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 21, 77-176.
Ministerio de Educación (2011). Análisis y evaluación de los aspectos educativos de la Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH). Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Educación de la Nación. Available at https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/ analisis_y_evaluacion_de_los_aspectos_educativos_de_la_auh.pdf (accesed 22-XI-2018)
Morais de Sá e Silva. M. (2017). Poverty reduction, education, and the global diffusion of conditional cash transfers. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-53094-9.
Morgan-Foster, Jason (2003). The relationship of IMF structural adjustment programs to economic, social, and cultural rights: the Argentine case revisited. Michigan Journal of International Law, 24, 577-646.
Morissens, A. (2018). The role of universal and targeted family benefits in reducing poverty in single-parent families in different employment situations. In R. Nieuwenhuis & L. C. Maldonado (eds.). The triple bind of single-parent families. Resources, employment and policies to improve well-being (359-381). Bristol: Policy Press at University of Bristol. doi:10.2307/j.ctt2204rvq.7
National Council on Employment. Resolution 3/2018, Productivity and the Minimum Wage (Spanish: Resolución 3/2018, Productividad y el Salario Mínimo, Vital y Móvil), issued on 8-VIII-2018.
Orrego Hoyos, G. (2013). The amparo context in Latin American jurisdiction: an approach to an empowering action. Globalex. Available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org /globalex/Amparo.htm (accesed 22-XI-2018).
Pautassi, L. (2017). Políticas sociales para la infancia en América Latina. Un balance urgente. Igualdad, autonomía y derechos sociales, 6, 45-91.
Pierri, G. & Assaad, R. (2014). The impact of Argentina’s Universal Child Allowance cash transfer program on children’s education outcomes. At http://paa2015.princeton.edu/papers/150844 (accesed 22-XI-2018).
Pribble, J. (2013). Welfare and party politics in Latin America. Cambridge University Press: New York. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139343299
Quiroga Lavié, H. (2000). Constitución de la Nación Argentina. Comentada (3rd ed.). Buenos Aires: Zavalía.
Rabinovich, L. & Diepeveen, S. (2015). The design of conditional cash transfers: Experiences from Argentina’s Universal Child Allowance. Development Policy Review, 33(5), 637-652. doi:10.1111/dpr.12127
Ravallion, M. (2016). The World Bank: why it is still needed and why it still disappoints. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(1), 77-94.
Ribe, H., Carvalho, S., Liebenthal, R., Nicholas, P. & Zucherman, E. (1990). How adjustment programs can help the poor. The World Bank’s experience. World Bank Discussion Papers, 71. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Rivera-Pérez, W. (2012). What the Constitution got to do with it: expanding the scope of constitutional rights into the private sphere. Creighton International and Comparative Law Journal, 3(1), 189-214.
Sagüés, N. P. (1999). Elementos de Derecho Constitucional (vols. 1 and 2). Buenos Aires: Astrea.
Skocpol, T. (1991). “Universal appeal: politically viable policies to combat poverty”. The Brookings Review, 9, 29-33.
Stampini, M. & Tornarolli, L. (2012). The growth of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean: did they go too far?, Policy Brief No. IDB-PB-185. Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank. Available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37306295 (accessed 22-XI-2018).
Straschnoy, M. (2016). “Usos y razones de las condicionalidades en la política social argentina”. In L. Pautassi & G. Gamallo (eds.). El bienestar en brechas. Las políticas sociales en la Argentina de la posconvertibilidad (167-198). Buenos Aires: Biblos.
UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (2012). Final draft of the guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights, submitted by the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona. A/HRC/21/39. Available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRB odies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-39_en.pdf (accesed 22-XI-2018).
Valencia Lomelí, E. (2008). Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America: an assessment of their contributions and limitations. Annual Review of Sociology, 34, 475-499.
Vommaro, G. (2017). La larga marcha de Cambiemos. La construcción silenciosa de un proyecto de poder. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
World Bank (2009). Report Nº 47874-AR (Project appraisal document on a proposed loan in the amount of US$450 million to the Argentine Republic for a basic protection project), Washington D.C.: World Bank.
World Bank (2011). Report Nº 59201-AR (Argentina - Basic Protection Project - additional financing). Washington D.C.: World Bank.
World Bank (2011b): “Argentina/World Bank: Social Protection Programs Expand to Benefit Children”, press release No:2011/362/LAC. 10-III-2011. Available at: http://go.worldbank.org/EHZC3EK3Z0 (accessed 22-XI-2018).
World Bank (2016). Report N° PAD1853 (Project appraisal document on a proposed loan in the amount of US$600 million to the Argentine Republic for a children and youth protection project). Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Published
2018-11-24
How to Cite
Etchichury, H. (2018). Planned Differences: Argentina’s Universal Child Allowance from a human rights perspective. Ius Humani. Law Journal, 7, 199-222. https://doi.org/10.31207/ih.v7i0.200
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